Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy -Alignment Report for Reference Architectural Model for Industrie4.0 / Intelligent Manufacturing System Architecture. Sino-German Industrie4.0 / Intelligent Manufacturing. Standardisation Sub-Working Group
The resources layer addresses standards regarding the distribution of all participating physical Industry 4.0 components. This includes equipment and machinery (typically at field and process level), control systems, applications and network infrastructure.
The communication layer includes standards regarding integration and communication protocols as well as related mechanisms that contribute to interoperability of components. Also includes the provision of services for control of the integration processes
The information layer focuses on standards that regulate information flows, information objects and data models being used by components, services and their functions to exchange information. A common semantic base is the key requirement to ensure consistent integration of different data and achieve interoperability between components at this layer.
The function layer includes standards that cumulate common functions derived from applications, systems and components. Remote access and horizontal integration take place within the layer to ensures the integrity of the information and conditions in the process and the integration of the technical level.
The business layer focuses on standards that represent business objectives and the resulting overall processes regarding the exchanged information at the lower layers. The layer addresses regulatory and market perspectives, business models, business cases and products, business processes and regulations influencing business models.
This is a collection of Industrial CyberSecurity Standards and de-facto standards relevant for organizations designing, developing, selecting, installing and operating digital manufacturing platforms. The selection was made on the basis of expert advisory and selections by researchers in their assessment of relevant State of the Art. Next to the standards, readers should also consider the works ongoing in standardisation efforts.
The following is a collection of Industrial CyberSecurity Standards and de-facto standards relevant for organizations designing, developing, selecting, installing and operating digital manufacturing platforms. The selection was made on the basis of expert advisory and selections by researchers in their assessment of relevant State of the Art. Next to the standards, readers should also consider the works ongoing in standardization efforts
ISO 27000 (or ISO27k) refers to a standard and a series of international standards (27001, 27002, ...) set up by the ISO (International Standards Organization) on information security management series (ISMS). The standard was initiated around 2005 and revised multiple times (2016, 2018) with the support of the different ISO member states representatives, people with an information security background and profession.
The standard describes a norm to which organizations can organize themselves in order to properly manage information and information security. It sets out a series policies, defines the setup of a system to control and manage the policies. Today the standard is being referred to by many compliancy requirement regulations and setups such as the Network and Information Security Directive by the European Commission and the European Member States.
The ISO 27000 series have been divised into multiple sub-standards
27001 :This is the specification for an information security management system (an ISMS) which replaced the old BS7799-2 standard
27002 : This is the 27000 series standard number of what was originally the ISO 17799 standard (which itself was formerly known as BS7799-1)
27003 : guidance for the implementation of an ISMS (IS Management System)
27004 : measurement and metrics
27005 : methodology independent ISO standard
27006 : accreditation of organizations offering ISMS certification.
27007 : ISMS auditing
27032 : CyberSecurity
27033 : Network Security
(* 27013 : Manufacturing)
The objective of the 27001 standard itself is to "provide requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining and continuously improving an Information Security Management System (ISMS)". Regarding its adoption, this should be a strategic decision. Further, "The design and implementation of an organization's information security management system is influenced by the organization's needs and objectives, security requirements, the organizational processes used and the size and structure of the organization". The original standard was more oriented towards planning and organizing, the later versions more towards measuring and evaluating. 27002 is about controls and control mechanisms.
Organizations can have their ISMS's or their ISO process certified, which can be needed for compliance reasons.
Provides guidance based on ISO/IEC 27002:2013 applied to process control systems used by the energy utility industry for controlling and monitoring the production or generation, transmission, storage and distribution of electric power, gas, oil and heat, and for the control of associated supporting processes.
central and distributed process control, monitoring and automation technology as well as information systems used for their operation, such as programming and parameterization devices;
digital controllers and automation components such as control and field devices or Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), including digital sensor and actuator elements;
all further supporting information systems used in the process control domain, e.g. for supplementary data visualization tasks and for controlling, monitoring, data archiving, historian logging, reporting and documentation purposes;
communication technology used in the process control domain, e.g. networks, telemetry, telecontrol applications and remote control technology;
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) components, e.g. smart meters;
measurement devices, e.g. for emission values; - digital protection and safety systems, e.g. protection relays, safety PLCs, emergency governor mechanisms;
energy management systems, e.g. of Distributed Energy Resources (DER), electric charging infrastructures,
all software, firmware and applications installed on above-mentioned systems, e.g. DMS (Distribution Management System) applications or OMS (Outage Management System); - any premises housing the above-mentioned equipment and systems;
remote maintenance systems for above-mentioned systems.
ISO/IEC 27019:2017 does not apply to the process control domain of nuclear facilities. This domain is covered by IEC 62645. ISO/IEC 27019:2017 also includes a requirement to adapt the risk assessment and treatment processes described in ISO/IEC 27001:2013 to the energy utility industry-sector?specific guidance provided in this document.
The ISA/IEC 62443 standard specifies security capabilities for (industrial) control system components. Developed by the ISA99 committee and adopted by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), provides a framework to address and mitigate security vulnerabilities in industrial automation and control systems (IACSs). it is based upon the input and knowledge of IACS security experts from across the globe to develop consensus standards that are applicable to all industry sectors and critical infrastructure. Central is the application of IACS security zones and conduits (isolation & segmentation), which were introduced in 62443-1-1,
ISA-62443-4-2, Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems: Technical Security Requirements for IACS Components, provides the cybersecurity technical requirements for components that make up an IACS, specifically the embedded devices, network components, host components, and software applications.
Based on the IACS system security requirements of ISA/IEC 62443‑3-3, System Security Requirements and Security Levels, 4-2 specifies security capabilities that enable a component to mitigate threats for a given security level without the assistance of compensating countermeasures.
ISA/IEC 62443-4-1, Product Security Development Life-Cycle Requirements, specifies process requirements for the secure development of products used in an IACS and defines a secure development life cycle for developing and maintaining secure products. The life cycle includes security requirements definition, secure design, secure implementation (including coding guidelines), verification and validation, defect management, patch management, and product end of life.
ISA/IEC 62443-3-2, Security Risk Assessment, System Partitioning and Security Levels, is based on the understanding that IACS security is a matter of risk management. 3-2 will define a set of engineering measures to guide organizations through the process of assessing the risk of a particular IACS and identifying and applying security countermeasures to reduce that risk to tolerable levels.
By aligning the identified target security level with the required security level capabilities 3‑3, System Security Requirements and Security Levels it takes the earlier 1-1 standard a step further. 2-3, Patch Management in the IACS Environment addresses the installation of patches, also called software updates, software upgrades, firmware upgrades, service packs, hot fixes, basic input/output system updates, and other digital electronic program updates that resolve bug fixes, operability, reliability, and cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It covers many of the problems and industry concerns associated with IACS patch management for asset owners and IACS product suppliers. It also describes the effects poor patch management can have on the reliability and operability of an IACS.
These requirements establish a standard way of expressing the assurance requirements for Targets of Evaluation (TOEs). This part of ISO/IEC 15408 catalogues the set of assurance components, families and classes. This part of ISO/IEC 15408 also defines evaluation criteria for PPs (Protection Profile) and STs (Security Target) and presents evaluation assurance levels that define the predefined ISO/IEC 15408 scale for rating assurance for TOEs, which is called the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs). The audience for this part of ISO/IEC 15408 includes consumers, developers, and evaluators of secure IT products. Developers, who respond to actual or perceived consumer security requirements in constructing a TOE, reference this part of ISO/IEC 15408 when interpreting statements of assurance requirements and
determining assurance approaches of TOEs.
The CIS Controls™ are a prioritized set of actions that collectively form a defense-in-depth set of best practices that mitigate the most common attacks against systems and networks. The CIS Controls are developed by a community of IT experts who apply their first-hand experience as cyber defenders to create these globally accepted security best practices. The experts who develop the CIS Controls come from a wide range of sectors including, retail, manufacturing, healthcare, education, government, defense, and others. So, while the CIS Controls address the general practices that most organizations should take to secure their systems, some operational environments may present unique requirements not addressed by the CIS Controls.
The guidance on how to apply the security best practices found in CIS Controls. For each top-level CIS Control, there is a brief discussion of how to interpret and apply the CIS Control in such environments, along with any unique considerations or differences from common IT environments. The applicability or not of specific Sub-Controls is addressed and additional steps needed in ICS environments are explained.
This document provides guidance on how to secure Industrial Control Systems (ICS), including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), while addressing their unique performance, reliability, and safety requirements. The document provides an overview of ICS and typical system topologies, identifies typical threats and vulnerabilities to these systems, and provides recommended security countermeasures to mitigate the associated risks.
ICS cybersecurity programs should always be part of broader ICS safety and reliability programs at both industrial sites and enterprise cybersecurity programs, because cybersecurity is essential to the safe and reliable operation of modern industrial processes. Threats to control systems can come from numerous sources, including hostile governments, terrorist groups, disgruntled employees, malicious intruders, complexities, accidents, and natural disasters as well as malicious or accidental actions by insiders. ICS security objectives typically follow the priority of availability and integrity, followed by confidentiality.
The Framework focuses on using business drivers to guide cybersecurity activities and considering cybersecurity risks as part of the organization’s risk management processes. The Framework consists of three parts: the Framework Core, the Implementation Tiers, and the Framework Profiles. The Framework Core is a set of cybersecurity activities, outcomes, and informative references that are common across sectors and critical infrastructure. Elements of the Core provide detailed guidance for developing individual organizational Profiles. Through use of Profiles, the Framework will help an organization to align and prioritize its cybersecurity activities with its business/mission requirements, risk tolerances, and resources. The Tiers provide a mechanism for organizations to view and understand the characteristics of their approach to managing cybersecurity risk, which will help in prioritizing and achieving cybersecurity objectives.
While this document was developed to improve cybersecurity risk management in critical infrastructure, the Framework can be used by organizations in any sector or community. The Framework enables organizations – regardless of size, degree of cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity sophistication – to apply the principles and best practices of risk management to improving security and resilience.
The Framework provides a common organizing structure for multiple approaches to cybersecurity by assembling standards, guidelines, and practices that are working effectively today.
The Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) Version 1.1 implementation details developed for the manufacturing environment. The “Manufacturing Profile” of the CSF can be used as a roadmap for reducing cybersecurity risk for manufacturers that is aligned with manufacturing sector goals and industry best practices. This Manufacturing Profile provides a voluntary, risk-based approach for managing cybersecurity activities and reducing cyber risk to manufacturing systems. The Manufacturing Profile is meant to enhance but not replace current cybersecurity standards and industry guidelines that the manufacturer is embracing.
Internet of Things (IoT) devices often lack device cybersecurity capabilities their customers organizations and individuals—can use to help mitigate their cybersecurity risks. Manufacturers can help their customers by improving how securable the IoT devices they make are by providing necessary cybersecurity functionality and by providing customers with the cybersecurity-related information they need. This publication describes recommended activities related to cybersecurity that manufacturers should consider performing before their IoT devices are sold to customers. These foundational cybersecurity activities can help manufacturers lessen the cybersecurity-related efforts needed by customers, which in turn can reduce the prevalence and severity of IoT device compromises and the attacks performed using compromised devices
While oriented in the first place to consumer devices, ETSI EN 303 645, a standard for cybersecurity in the Internet of Things is relevant for manufacturing considerations. The standard establishes a security baseline for internet-connected consumer products and provides a basis for future IoT certification schemes. Based on the ETSI specification TS 103 645, EN 303 645 went through National Standards Organization comments and voting, engaging even more stakeholders in its development and ultimately strengthening the resulting standard. The EN is a result of collaboration and expertise from industry, academics and government.
ETSI EN 303 645 specifies 13 provisions for the security of Internet-connected consumer devices and their associated services. IoT products in scope include connected children’s toys and baby monitors, connected safety-relevant products such as smoke detectors and door locks, smart cameras, TVs and speakers, wearable health trackers, connected home automation and alarm systems, connected appliances (e.g. washing machines, fridges) and smart home assistants. The EN also includes 5 specific data protection provisions for consumer IoT.
Development of standards for cybersecurity and data protection covering all aspects of the evolving information society including but not limited to: - Management systems, frameworks, methodologies - Data protection and privacy - Services and products evaluation standards suitable for security assessment for large companies and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) - Competence requirements for cybersecurity and data protection - Security requirements, services, techniques and guidelines for ICT systems, services, networks and devices, including smart objects and distributed computing devices Included in the scope is the identification and possible adoption of documents already published or under development by ISO/IEC JTC 1and other SDOs and international bodies such as ISO, IEC, ITU-T, and industrial fora. Where not being developed by other SDO's, the development of cybersecurity and data protection CEN/CENELEC publications for safeguarding information such as organizational frameworks, management systems, techniques, guidelines, and products and services, including those in support of the EU Digital Single Market.
Its scope is to contribute, support and coordinate the preparation of international standards for systems and elements used for industrial process measurement, control and automation at CENELEC level. To coordinate standardisation activities which affect integration of components and functions into such systems including safety and security aspects. This CENELEC work of standardisation is to be carried out for equipment and systems and closely coordinated with IEC TC65 and its subcommittees with the objective of avoiding any duplication of work while honouring standing agreements between CENELEC and IEC.
The Smart Applications REFerence (SAREF) ontology is a shared model of consensus that facilitates the matching of existing assets in the smart applications domain. SAREF provides building blocks that allow separation and recombination of different parts of the ontology depending on specific needs.
SAREF4INMA, an extension of SAREF that was created for the industry and manufacturing domain. SAREF4INMA was created to be aligned with related initiatives in the smart industry and manufacturing domain in terms of modelling and standardization, such as the Reference Architecture Model for Industry 4.0 (RAMI), which combines several standards used by the various national initiatives in Europe that support digitalization in manufacturing.
These initiatives include, but are not limited to, the platform Industrie 4.0 in Germany, the Smart Industry initiative in the Netherlands, Industria 4.0 in Italy, the 'Industrie du future initiative' in France and more.
It extends SAREF with 24 classes (in addition to a number of classes directly reused from the SAREF ontology and the SAREF4BLDG extension), 20 object properties (in addition to a number of object properties reused from the SAREF ontology and the SAREF4BLDG extension) and 11 data type properties. SAREF4INMA focuses on extending SAREF for the industry and manufacturing domain to solve the lack of interoperability between various types of production equipment that produce items in a factory and, once outside the factory, between different organizations in the value chain to uniquely track back the produced items to the corresponding production equipment, batches, material and precise time in which they were manufactured.
The Industrial Internet Security Framework (IISF) is a cross-industry-focused security framework comprising expert vision, experience and security best practices. It reflects thousands of hours of knowledge and experiences from security experts, collected, researched and evaluated for the benefit of all IIoT system deployments.
It builds on the ‘Industrial Internet of Things Reference Architecture’ (IIRA), that lays out the most important architecture components, how they fit together and how they influence each other. Each of these components must be made secure, as must the key system characteristics that bind them together into a trustworthy system.
It reviews security assessment for organizations, architectures and technologies. It outlines how to evaluate attacks as part of a risk analysis and highlights the many factors that should be considered, ranging from the endpoints and communications to management systems and the supply chains of the elements comprising the system. Different roles are identified that should be considered in conjunction with the key characteristics, including, owner/operator, system integrator/builder and equipment vendor. Each role offers different risk management perspectives that affect the decisions regarding security and privacy.
An industry-accepted way to document what security controls exist in IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS services, providing security control transparency. It provides a set of Yes/No questions a cloud consumer and cloud auditor may wish to ask of a cloud provider to ascertain their compliance to the Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM).
It helps cloud service providers and their customers to gauge the security posture and determine if their cloud services are suitably secure. In addition to improving the clarity and accuracy, it also supports better auditability of the CCM controls.
The overall concept is the use of the Admnistrative Asset Shell (AAS). It is requesting access to an object. In the context of an AAS an object typically is a submodel or a property or any other submodel element connected to the asset. The implemented access control mechanism of the AAS evaluates the access permission rules (2a) that include constraints that need to be fulfilled w.r.t. the subject attributes (2b), the object attributes and the environment conditions (2d). The focus is on access control. An object in the context of ABAC corresponds typically to a submodel or to a submodel element. The object attributes again are modelled as submodel elements. Subject Attributes need to be accessed either via an external policy information point or they are defined as properties within a special submodel of the AAS. A typical subject attribute is its role. The role is the only subject attribute defined in case of role based access control. Optionally, environment conditions can be defined. In role based access control no environment conditions are defined. Environment conditions can be expressed via formula constraints. To be able to do so the values needed should be defined as property or reference to data within a submodel of the AAS.
NAMUR, the "User Association of Automation Technology in Process Industries", is an international association of user companies (established in 1949) and represents their interests concerning automation technology. NAMUR numbers over 150 member companies. The achievement of added value through automation engineering is at the forefront in all NAMUR member company activities. NAMUR conducts a frank and fair dialogue with manufacturers.
NAMUR’s Automation Security working group 4.18 addresses issues including the following topics in the context of its experience exchange, its concept developments, formulation of requirements to be met by automation solutions and its involvement in national and international standardisation.
Relevant recommendations and worksheets
NA 163 Security Risk Assessment of SIS (Safety Instrumented Systems)
NA 169 Automation Security Management in the Process Industry. NA 169 describes the steps to systematically build a Cyber Security Management System (CSMS) for automation systems in the process industry in order to ensure the correct operation of the functional safety devices, to protect critical data and to ensure the availability and reliability of the plants
The international standard IEC 61499, addressing the topic of function blocks for industrial process measurement and control systems, was initially published in 2005. The specification of IEC 61499 defines a generic model for distributed control systems and is based on the IEC 61131 standard. (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEC_61499 and IEC 61499 - International Electrotechnical Commission.
MQTT (MQ Telemetry Transport) is an open OASIS and ISO standard (ISO/IEC PRF 20922) lightweight, publish-subscribe network protocol that transports messages between devices. (From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MQTT)
Universal Business Language (UBL) is an open library of standard electronic XML business documents for procurement and transportation such as purchase orders, invoices, transport logistics and waybills. UBL was developed by an OASIS Technical Committee with participation from a variety of industry data standards organizations. Version 2.1 was approved as an OASIS Standard in November 2013 and an ISO Standard (ISO/IEC 19845:2015) in December 2015
SensorThings API is an Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) standard providing an open and unified framework to interconnect IoT sensing devices, data, and applications over the Web. It is an open standard addressing the syntactic interoperability and semantic interoperability of the Internet of Things. It complements the existing IoT networking protocols such CoAP, MQTT, HTTP, 6LowPAN. While the above-mentioned IoT networking protocols are addressing the ability for different IoT systems to exchange information, OGC SensorThings API is addressing the ability for different IoT systems to use and understand the exchanged information. As an OGC standard, SensorThings API also allows easy integration into existing Spatial Data Infrastructures or Geographic Information Systems.
The W3C Web Ontology Language (OWL) is a Semantic Web language designed to represent rich and complex knowledge about things, groups of things, and relations between things. (from https://www.w3.org/OWL/)
In general, compliance means conforming to a rule, such as a specification, policy, standard or law. Regulatory compliance describes the goal that organizations aspire to achieve in their efforts to ensure that they are aware of and take steps to comply with relevant laws, policies, and regulations. (from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulatory_compliance)