Dataspaces are an abstraction in data management that aim to overcome some of the problems encountered in data integration system. The aim is to reduce the effort required to set up a data integration system by relying on existing matching and mapping generation techniques, and to improve the system in "pay-as-you-go" fashion as it is used. (From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dataspaces)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relational_database_management_system

Fuzzy logic is a form of many-valued logic in which the truth values of variables may be any real number between 0 and 1 inclusive. It is employed to handle the concept of partial truth, where the truth value may range between completely true and completely false (from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzzy_logic)

Artificial neural networks (ANN) or connectionist systems are computing systems vaguely inspired by the biological neural networks and astrocytes that constitute animal brains. The neural network itself is not an algorithm, but rather a framework for many different machine learning algorithms to work together and process complex data inputs.[4] Such systems "learn" to perform tasks by considering examples, generally without being programmed with any task-specific rules. (from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_neural_network)

In computer science and operations research, a genetic algorithm (GA) is a metaheuristic inspired by the process of natural selection that belongs to the larger class of evolutionary algorithms (EA). Genetic algorithms are commonly used to generate high-quality solutions to optimization and search problems by relying on bio-inspired operators such as mutation, crossover and selection. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetic_algorithm)

A heuristic function, also called simply a heuristic, is a function that ranks alternatives in search algorithms at each branching step based on available information to decide which branch to follow. (from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heuristic_(computer_science))

API's (and REST API's) need to be carefully protected through mechanisms limiting access on the basis of identity and authorizing and authenticating through managed and controlled mechanisms. Usually certificates and IP-addresses are being used to restrict access to API's, but a more granular approach is advisable from a Security Architecture perspective. Other architectures being used as Integratio Protocols in Digital Manufacturing Platforms are JSON (for its near real time capabilities) and MQ (message bus architectures). The letter being less secure, since it provides a continuous stream of information which is being sent to a destination. 

Authorisation is the process of allowing an entity (humans, systems or devices) to access information systems or facilities where information and processing capabilities are being stored. More practical in an industrial setting for Digital Manufacturing Platforms, an authorized person can get access to an operational machine in order to update it, or investigate its contents. Unauthorized access could be someone who has been able to access the network from the outside, performing actions that have not been authorized and cannot be justified.

Authentication is a means to assess the authorization rules of an entity by means of a set of instruments. In the case of Digital Manufacturing Platforms it would be the instruments like user name and password, and in addition a second factor such as a physical token or a mobile phone that can authenticate the person accessing the platform. The physical token connects the person to something he has, the password to something he knows. 

A third A in the AAA-architecture is related to Access. Once authorized, and authenticated, access can be granted to the location, system, application, and / or information. Access control levels can thus be set up on different layers. These can be physical (access to the country, to the plant, to the building, the room and the environment where the system is located), and logical (using authentication technologies). In Digital Manufacturing Platforms this means the systems could be accessible only on premise, in the factory or for instance in the (private or public) cloud. As a result different access mechanisms needs to be considered, depending on the risk and intended security levels and controls. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AAA_(computer_security) ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authorization

See also:

• https://www.iec.ch/cybersecurity/?ref=extfooter
• https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-standards/isa-standards-committees/isa99  (Including a diagram depicting the status of the various work products in the ISA/IEC 62443 series of IACS standards and technical report)

The ISA/IEC 62443 standard specifies security capabilities for (industrial) control system components. Developed by the ISA99 committee and adopted by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), provides a framework to address and mitigate security vulnerabilities in industrial automation and control systems (IACSs). it is based upon the input and knowledge of IACS security experts from across the globe to develop consensus standards that are applicable to all industry sectors and critical infrastructure. Central is the application of IACS security zones and conduits (isolation & segmentation), which were introduced in 62443-1-1,

ISA-62443-4-2, Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems: Technical Security Requirements for IACS Components, provides the cybersecurity technical requirements for components that make up an IACS, specifically the embedded devices, network components, host components, and software applications.

Based on the IACS system security requirements of ISA/IEC 62443‑3-3, System Security Requirements and Security Levels, 4-2 specifies security capabilities that enable a component to mitigate threats for a given security level without the assistance of compensating countermeasures.

ISA/IEC 62443-4-1, Product Security Development Life-Cycle Requirements, specifies process requirements for the secure development of products used in an IACS and defines a secure development life cycle for developing and maintaining secure products. The life cycle includes security requirements definition, secure design, secure implementation (including coding guidelines), verification and validation, defect management, patch management, and product end of life.

ISA/IEC 62443-3-2, Security Risk Assessment, System Partitioning and Security Levels, is based on the understanding that IACS security is a matter of risk management. 3-2 will define a set of engineering measures to guide organizations through the process of assessing the risk of a particular IACS and identifying and applying security countermeasures to reduce that risk to tolerable levels.

By aligning the identified target security level with the required security level capabilities 3‑3, System Security Requirements and Security Levels it takes the earlier 1-1 standard a step further. 2-3, Patch Management in the IACS Environment addresses the installation of patches, also called software updates, software upgrades, firmware upgrades, service packs, hot fixes, basic input/output system updates, and other digital electronic program updates that resolve bug fixes, operability, reliability, and cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It covers many of the problems and industry concerns associated with IACS patch management for asset owners and IACS product suppliers. It also describes the effects poor patch management can have on the reliability and operability of an IACS.

These requirements establish a standard way of expressing the assurance requirements for Targets of Evaluation (TOEs). This part of ISO/IEC 15408 catalogues the set of assurance components, families and classes. This part of ISO/IEC 15408 also defines evaluation criteria for PPs (Protection Profile) and STs (Security Target) and presents evaluation assurance levels that define the predefined ISO/IEC 15408 scale for rating assurance for TOEs, which is called the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs). The audience for this part of ISO/IEC 15408 includes consumers, developers, and evaluators of secure IT products. Developers, who respond to actual or perceived consumer security requirements in constructing a TOE, reference this part of ISO/IEC 15408 when interpreting statements of assurance requirements and
determining assurance approaches of TOEs.

https://www.iso.org/standard/50341.html
https://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/c050341_ISO_IEC_15408-1_2009.zip (public download)

The CIS Controls™ are a prioritized set of actions that collectively form a defense-in-depth set of best practices that mitigate the most common attacks against systems and networks. The CIS Controls are developed by a community of IT experts who apply their first-hand experience as cyber defenders to create these globally accepted security best practices. The experts who develop the CIS Controls come from a wide range of sectors including, retail, manufacturing, healthcare, education, government, defense, and others. So, while the CIS Controls address the general practices that most organizations should take to secure their systems, some operational environments may present unique requirements not addressed by the CIS Controls.

The guidance on how to apply the security best practices found in CIS Controls. For each top-level CIS Control, there is a brief discussion of how to interpret and apply the CIS Control in such environments, along with any unique considerations or differences from common IT environments. The applicability or not of  specific Sub-Controls is addressed and additional steps needed in ICS environments are explained.

https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/cis-controls-implementation-guide-for-industrial-control-systems/

This document provides guidance on how to secure Industrial Control Systems (ICS), including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), while addressing their unique performance, reliability, and safety requirements. The document provides an overview of ICS and typical system topologies, identifies typical threats and vulnerabilities to these systems, and provides recommended security countermeasures to mitigate the associated risks.

ICS cybersecurity programs should always be part of broader ICS safety and reliability programs at both industrial sites and enterprise cybersecurity programs, because cybersecurity is essential to the safe and reliable operation of modern industrial processes. Threats to control systems can come from numerous sources, including hostile governments, terrorist groups, disgruntled employees, malicious intruders, complexities, accidents, and natural disasters as well as malicious or accidental actions by insiders. ICS security objectives typically follow the priority of availability and integrity, followed by confidentiality.

https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-82/rev-2/final

The Framework focuses on using business drivers to guide cybersecurity activities and considering cybersecurity risks as part of the organization’s risk management processes. The Framework consists of three parts: the Framework Core, the Implementation Tiers, and the Framework Profiles. The Framework Core is a set of cybersecurity activities, outcomes, and informative references that are common across sectors and critical infrastructure. Elements of the Core provide detailed guidance for developing individual organizational Profiles. Through use of Profiles, the Framework will help an organization to align and prioritize its cybersecurity activities with its business/mission requirements, risk tolerances, and resources. The Tiers provide a mechanism for organizations to view and understand the characteristics of their approach to managing cybersecurity risk, which will help in prioritizing and achieving cybersecurity objectives.

While this document was developed to improve cybersecurity risk management in critical infrastructure, the Framework can be used by organizations in any sector or community. The Framework enables organizations – regardless of size, degree of cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity sophistication – to apply the principles and best practices of risk management to improving security and resilience.

The Framework provides a common organizing structure for multiple approaches to cybersecurity by assembling standards, guidelines, and practices that are working effectively today.

https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework

The Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) Version 1.1 implementation details developed for the manufacturing environment. The “Manufacturing Profile” of the CSF can be used as a roadmap for reducing cybersecurity risk for manufacturers that is aligned with manufacturing sector goals and industry best practices. This Manufacturing Profile provides a voluntary, risk-based approach for managing cybersecurity activities and reducing cyber risk to manufacturing systems. The Manufacturing Profile is meant to enhance but not replace current cybersecurity standards and industry guidelines that the manufacturer is embracing.

https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/nistir/8183/rev-1/final

Internet of Things (IoT) devices often lack device cybersecurity capabilities their customers organizations and individuals—can use to help mitigate their cybersecurity risks. Manufacturers can help their customers by improving how securable the IoT devices they make are by providing necessary cybersecurity functionality and by providing customers with the cybersecurity-related information they need. This publication describes recommended activities related to cybersecurity that manufacturers should consider performing before their IoT devices are sold to customers. These foundational cybersecurity activities can help manufacturers lessen the cybersecurity-related efforts needed by customers, which in turn can reduce the prevalence and severity of IoT device compromises and the attacks performed using compromised devices

https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/nistir/8259/final

While oriented in the first place to consumer devices,  ETSI EN 303 645, a standard for cybersecurity in the Internet of Things is relevant for manufacturing considerations. The standard establishes a security baseline for internet-connected consumer products and provides a basis for future IoT certification schemes. Based on the ETSI specification TS 103 645, EN 303 645 went through National Standards Organization comments and voting, engaging even more stakeholders in its development and ultimately strengthening the resulting standard. The EN is a result of collaboration and expertise from industry, academics and government.

ETSI EN 303 645 specifies 13 provisions for the security of Internet-connected consumer devices and their associated services. IoT products in scope include connected children’s toys and baby monitors, connected safety-relevant products such as smoke detectors and door locks, smart cameras, TVs and speakers, wearable health trackers, connected home automation and alarm systems, connected appliances (e.g. washing machines, fridges) and smart home assistants. The EN also includes 5 specific data protection provisions for consumer IoT.

https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/303600_303699/303645/02.01.01_60/en_303645v020101p.pdf

Development of standards for cybersecurity and data protection covering all aspects of the evolving information society including but not limited to: - Management systems, frameworks, methodologies - Data protection and privacy - Services and products evaluation standards suitable for security assessment for large companies and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) - Competence requirements for cybersecurity and data protection - Security requirements, services, techniques and guidelines for ICT systems, services, networks and devices, including smart objects and distributed computing devices Included in the scope is the identification and possible adoption of documents already published or under development by ISO/IEC JTC 1and other SDOs and international bodies such as ISO, IEC, ITU-T, and industrial fora. Where not being developed by other SDO's, the development of cybersecurity and data protection CEN/CENELEC publications for safeguarding information such as organizational frameworks, management systems, techniques, guidelines, and products and services, including those in support of the EU Digital Single Market.

https://www.cen.eu/work/Sectors/Digital_society/Pages/Cybersecurity.aspx

https://www.cenelec.eu/dyn/www/f?p=104:7:123858409050001::::FSP_ORG_ID,FSP_LANG_ID:2307986,25

Its scope is to contribute, support and coordinate the preparation of international standards for systems and elements used for industrial process measurement, control and automation at CENELEC level. To coordinate standardisation activities which affect integration of components and functions into such systems including safety and security aspects. This CENELEC work of standardisation is to be carried out for equipment and systems and closely coordinated with IEC TC65 and its subcommittees with the objective of avoiding any duplication of work while honouring standing agreements between CENELEC and IEC.

https://www.cenelec.eu/dyn/www/f?p=104:7:0::::FSP_ORG_ID:1257871

https://www.cenelec.eu/aboutcenelec/whatwedo/technologysectors/DigitalSociety-topics.html

See https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/standards/certification

The Industrial Internet Security Framework (IISF) is a cross-industry-focused security framework comprising expert vision, experience and security best practices. It reflects thousands of hours of knowledge and experiences from security experts, collected, researched and evaluated for the benefit of all IIoT system deployments.
It builds on the ‘Industrial Internet of Things Reference Architecture’ (IIRA), that lays out the most important architecture components, how they fit together and how they influence each other. Each of these components must be made secure, as must the key system characteristics that bind them together into a trustworthy system.

It reviews security assessment for organizations, architectures and technologies. It outlines how to evaluate attacks as part of a risk analysis and highlights the many factors that should be considered, ranging from the endpoints and communications to management systems and the supply chains of the elements comprising the system. Different roles are identified that should be considered in conjunction with the key characteristics, including, owner/operator, system integrator/builder and equipment vendor. Each role offers different risk management perspectives that affect the decisions regarding security and privacy.

https://www.iiconsortium.org/IISF.htm
https://www.iiconsortium.org/pdf/IIC_PUB_G4_V1.00_PB-3.pdf

An industry-accepted way to document what security controls exist in IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS services, providing security control transparency. It provides a set of Yes/No questions a cloud consumer and cloud auditor may wish to ask of a cloud provider to ascertain their compliance to the Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM).  

It helps cloud service providers and their customers to gauge the security posture and determine if their cloud services are suitably secure. In addition to improving the clarity and accuracy, it also supports better auditability of the CCM controls.

https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/artifacts/consensus-assessments-initiative-questionnaire-v3-1/

NAMUR, the "User Association of Automation Technology in Process Industries", is an international association of user companies (established in 1949) and represents their interests concerning automation technology. NAMUR numbers over 150 member companies. The achievement of added value through automation engineering is at the forefront in all NAMUR member company activities. NAMUR conducts a frank and fair dialogue with manufacturers.

NAMUR’s Automation Security working group 4.18 addresses issues including the following topics in the context of its experience exchange, its concept developments, formulation of requirements to be met by automation solutions and its involvement in national and international standardisation.

Relevant recommendations and worksheets

• NA 163    Security Risk Assessment of SIS (Safety Instrumented Systems)
• NA 169    Automation Security Management in the Process Industry.  NA 169 describes the steps to systematically build a Cyber Security Management System (CSMS) for automation systems in the process industry in order to ensure the correct operation of the functional safety devices, to protect critical data and to ensure the availability and reliability of the plants

See Namur website WG 4.18 pages

https://owasp.org/

https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/

OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) is a machine to machine communication protocol for industrial automation developed by the OPC Foundation.
(see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OPC_Unified_Architecture)

https://projects.eclipse.org

http://wiki.ros.org/